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THE EUROPEAN UNION’S DUBLIN 
REGULATION AND THE MIGRANT CRISIS  
INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, over one million migrants1 arrived in the European Union 
(“EU”).2 Many of the migrants were fleeing war and persecution in Syria, 
Afghanistan, Eritrea and other countries in Africa and the Middle East.3 
The majority of the migrants sought asylum in the EU, a haven where they 
believed they could find work and opportunities for a better life.4 The EU, 
however, was financially and administratively unprepared for the 
unprecedented influx of migrants because it was recovering from a 
financial crisis.5 The EU’s migration policy, embodied in its “Dublin 
Regulation III” (the “Dublin Regulation”), requires that migrants register 
and apply for asylum in the EU member state they enter first.6 
Consequently, EU member states (“Member States”)7 closest in proximity 
                                                        
1   The term migrant refers to a person who moves from one place to another and includes both 
people who are seeking asylum and refugee status and people who are seeking new economic 
opportunities. The term asylum seeker refers only to the former of these two groups. See International 
Organization for Migration, Key Migration Terms, https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms. 
2   The European Commission, The EU and the Migration Crisis, (July 2017), 
http://publications.europa.eu/webpub/com/factsheets/migration-crisis/en/. Trafficking from Turkey to 
the Greek islands of Kos, Chios, Lesvos and Samos account for a large portion of this figure. See infra 
note 133.  
3   The European Commission, supra note 2. See also Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe 
Explained in Seven Charts, BBC NEWS (Mar. 4, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
34131911. Large numbers of migrants also came from Kosovo, Albania, Iraq, and Pakistan. Id. 
4   The European Commission, supra note 2. Before Europe’s migration crisis, migrants sought 
asylum in nearby non-EU countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. King’s College London, 
Why Do Refugees and Migrants Come To Europe, and What Must Be Done to Ease the Crisis?, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Sept. 4, 2015), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/11845205/Why-do-
refugees-and-migrants-come-to-Europe-and-what-must-be-done-to-ease-the-crisis.html. However, 
these Middle Eastern countries soon reached a point where they could no longer support the growing 
number of migrants with basic services like food and shelter. Id. Migrants have thus decided to move 
on to countries with more resources, like the UK, which at the time had a per capita eight times that of 
Jordan and similarly situated countries. Id. The UK also had just under 200,000 refugees, less than a 
quarter of the one million refugees in countries like Jordan. Id. In addition, wealthier Middle Eastern 
countries including Saudi Arabia, have shown an unwillingness to accept more refugees. Id. See also 
Matthew Weaver, Syrian Refugees: More Than 5m in Neighbouring Countries Now, Says UN, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/30/syrian-refugee-number-
passes-5m-mark-un-reveals (describing the situation in Middle Eastern countries prior to the crisis in 
Europe). 
5   Mark Koba, ‘A Cheat Sheet’ on the Europe Crisis, CNBC (June 13, 2012), 
http://archive.is/bMQ4. The EU suffered from a financial crisis beginning in 2009, which raged on as 
migrants began to flood into the EU. Countries like Greece and Spain were in billions of dollars of 
debt and banks throughout the union were failing. Id. 
6   See infra notes 10-13. 
7  Member states of the European Union must agree to the founding treaties of the EU and are 
bound by the EU’s laws and regulations. In return, member states are given representation in the EU 
legislature and judiciary. See Countries, EUROPEAN UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
 












to Africa and the Middle East were placed under considerable economic 
strain during the influx.8 As a result, the Dublin Regulation and its 
efficiency has been called into serious question.9 Three years after the 
initial spike in migration, the migration numbers have fallen dramatically 
because the EU and other member states took a number of actions in 
attempts to quell the number of entering migrants, including the 
controversial building of border fences.10 Nevertheless, many of the issues 
underlying the Dublin Regulation, such as the disproportionate strain 
placed on certain countries and the violation of the human rights of asylum 
seekers, still exist. Leaders and scholars alike continue to call for its 
reformation or complete overhaul.11    
                                                                                                                              
eu/countries_en (last visited Feb. 24, 2020); How EU decisions are made, EUROPEAN UNION, 
https://europa.eu/european-union/eu-law/decision-making/procedures_en (last visited Feb. 24, 2020); 
EU courts, EUROPEAN E-JUSTICE, 
 https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_eu_courts-15-en.do (last visited Feb. 24, 2020). 
8   See Park, infra note 65, at 4. 
9 See Regulation 604/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 180) 31 available at 
https://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:180:0031:0059:EN:PDF. The 
migration crisis in Europe tested the limits of the current legislation, forcing the EU to brainstorm how 
to reform it once more. The European Commission proposed a Dublin IV Regulation in 2016, which 
would promote burden sharing by a “corrective allocation mechanism in cases of disproportionate 
pressure”, punish asylum shopping and other abuses of the asylum system, and further take into 
account the best interests of migrants. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible 
for Examining an Application for International Protection Lodged in One of the Member States by a 
Third-Country National or a Stateless Person (recast), at 18, COM (2016) 270 final (May 4, 2016). 
10  Jon Henley, What is the Current State of the Migration Crisis in Europe?, GUARDIAN (June 
15, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/15/what-current-scale-migration-crisis-
europe-future-outlook. See infra note 137. European governments made deportation agreements with 
non-EU countries that helped quell the migration flows into the EU. Patrick Kingsley, Migration to 
Europe Is Down Sharply. So Is It Still a ‘Crisis’?, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/06/27/world/europe/europe-migrant-crisis-change.html. 
Turkey agreed to take back migrants who illegally enter the EU in exchange for almost seven billion 
euros in aid, visa free travel within the EU for Turkish citizens, and reopening of negotiations with 
Turkey on EU membership. James Kanter, European Union Reaches Deal With Turkey to Return New 
Asylum Seekers, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/19/world/europe/european-union-turkey-refugees-migrants.html. 
After the agreement was made effective, migrant arrivals to Greece from Turkey dropped a drastic 
ninety-seven percent by 2018. European Commission, EU-Turkey Statement - Two Years On, at 1 
(Apr. 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-
agenda-migration/20171207_eu_turkey_statement_en.pdf. Similar deals have been made with Niger 
and Sudan. Adam Nossiter, At French Outpost in African Migrant Hub, Asylum for a Select Few, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/25/world/africa/france-africa-migrants-
asylum-niger.html; Patrick Kingsley, By Stifling Migration, Sudan’s Feared Secret Police Aid Europe, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/22/world/africa/migration-european-
union-sudan.html.  















The Dublin Regulation designates which EU member state is 
responsible for reviewing and processing an asylum application.12 It states 
in relevant part, “Member States shall examine any application for 
international protection by a third-country national or a stateless person . . 
. The application shall be examined by a single Member State, which shall 
be the one which the criteria set out in Chapter III indicate is 
responsible.”13 Further, “[w]here no Member State responsible can be 
designated on the basis of the criteria listed in this Regulation, the first 
Member State in which the application for international protection was 
lodged shall be responsible for examining it.”14 The latter is usually the 
case for asylum seekers because asylum authorities do not give preference 
to family unity over criteria involving an asylum seeker’s documentation 
or country of entry as intended by the Dublin Regulation.15 Thus the “first 
Member State in which the application for international protection was 
lodged,” also known as the state of first entry, is usually the responsible 
member state.16 If all the member states had a proportionate amount of 
asylum seekers entering their borders to the member state’s resources and 
size, the “state of first entry” rule would be an efficient means to balancing 
out responsibility for asylum applications amongst the member states. In 
reality, a few EU member states consistently carry a heavier burden of 
responsibility for asylum applications.17 
                                                                                                                              
reform-parliament-s-stance-on-dublin-regulation (confirming the EU Parliament’s call for reform of 
the Dublin Regulation). Duncan Robinson, How the EU Plans to Overhaul ‘Dublin Regulation’ on 
Asylum Claims, THE FIN. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/d08dc262-bed1-11e5-
9fdb-87b8d15baec2 (emphasizing the EU’s desire to reform or do away with the current Dublin 
Regulation); Laura Helena R. Suy, The Dublin Regulation (2014) (unpublished Master Thesis, 
Aalborg Universitet København) (on file with the Project Library, Aalborg Universitet København).  
12  Regulation 604/2013, supra note 9, at 31.  
13  Id. at 37. According to Chapter III of the Dublin Regulation, the member state where an 
unaccompanied minor’s family is legally located or where a person’s family has been afforded 
international protection or where a person’s family has submitted applications for international 
protection is responsible for that minor’s or person’s asylum application. Id. at 39.  
14  Id.  
15  Susan Fratzke, Not Adding Up: The Fading Promise of Europe’s Dublin System 4-5 (2015). 
The Dublin Regulation lists a hierarchy of criteria that asylum authorities are to use when evaluating 
which member state is responsible for an asylum seeker’s application. Id. At the top of the hierarchy 
are minors, who are the responsibility of the member state where his or her family members are legally 
present. Id. The second criteria states that a member state is responsible for an asylum seeker if he or 
she has family members in that member state, whether legally present or not. Id. See also Regulation 
604/2013, supra note 9, at 39.  
16  Regulation 604/2013, supra note 9, at 37; European Commission, Country Responsible for 
Asylum Application (Dublin), https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/asylum/examination-of-applicants_en.  
17  Patrick J. Lyons, Explaining the Rules for Migrants: Borders and Asylum, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/17/world/europe/europe-refugees-migrants-rules.html.  












Since the spike in migrant numbers in 2015, tensions between the 
member states with the most responsibility for asylum applications and the 
rest of the EU member states have increased dramatically.18 Italy, a 
common state of first entry for migrants, has been at the fore in criticizing 
the EU’s failure to control the migrant crisis because it has been forced to 
accept responsibility for a disproportionate amount of migrants compared 
to other member states.19 In June 2018, Italy’s Interior Minister Matteo 
Salvini promised Italians that, contrary to the Dublin Regulation, Italy 
would drastically decrease the number of migrants entering the country 
and increase the number of deportations of illegal migrants.20 He proposed 
creating deportation centers and taking legal action against organizations 
that rescue migrants at sea and bring them to Italy.21 Just days later, 
Salvini began to make good on his promise by banning ships carrying 
rescued migrants from docking at Italian ports.22 Salvini refused to allow 
another boat of nearly two hundred migrants to disembark, urging the rest 
of the EU member states to take responsibility for the migrants on the 
boat.23 Italy’s Deputy Prime Minister, Luigi Di Maio, threatened to 
withhold twenty-three billion USD, or twenty billion euros, that Italy pays 
to the EU every year if other member states did not pledge to take 
                                                        
18  Alessandro Giovanni Borghese, Why European Tension Is Rising Over Migrants (Again), 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 29, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-
22/why-european-tension-is-rising-over-migrants-again-quicktake. 
19  Soeren Kern, Italy and Hungary Create 'Anti-Immigration Axis', GATESTONE INST. (Sept. 
01, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/12945/italy-hungary-immigration.  
20  Italy Migrants: Matteo Salvini Calls For End to Sicily 'Refugee Camp', BBC NEWS (June 3, 
2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44346084. Salvini was elected in the midst of a 
growing dissatisfaction with the previous government’s response to the migration crisis. Ritula Shah, 
Italian Election Dominated by Immigration Debate, BBC NEWS (Feb. 26, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43167699.  
21  BBC NEWS, supra note 20. 
22  Italy's Matteo Salvini Shuts Ports to Migrant Rescue Ship, BBC NEWS (June 11, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44432056. The Aquarius held over six hundred migrants 
that were rescued at six different ports in Libya. The rescue ship is NGO sponsored and tasked with 
rescuing migrants and delivering them to the closest EU country. Antonio Denti, Migrant Rescue Ship 
Aquarius Returns to Sea After Italy-Malta Dispute, REUTERS (Aug. 1, 2018), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-ngo/migrant-rescue-ship-aquarius-returns-to-sea-
after-italy-malta-dispute-idUSKBN1KM51V. According to International Convention for the Safety of 
Life at Sea, the country responsible for taking in the migrants on the ship is the country responsible for 
operations in that area of the sea. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, 
1184 U.N.T.S. 3, V/7.1. In this case, Italy or Malta would have been required to allow the Aquarius to 
disembark on its shores. Id. However, Malta claimed that the ship fell within Italy’s jurisdiction and 
that it was not responsible for it. Denti, supra. The ship was eventually taken in by Spain. Id. 
23  BBC NEWS, Italy Migrant Row: Rescue Ship Allowed to Disembark in Sicily (August 26, 
2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45310479. Italy eventually allowed the ship to 
disembark after six days at sea. The United Nations also stepped in and urged other member states to 













responsibility for migrants in Italy.24 Italy cites the lack of housing and 
employment opportunities available for its hard stance on anti-
immigration.25 It also complains that the country can barely provide for its 
own citizens, let alone hundreds of thousands of migrants.26 
Other member states followed Italy’s lead, resulting in the creation of 
the “Anti-Immigration Axis” in opposition to the EU’s pro-immigration 
laws and policies.27 The Anti-Immigration Axis consists of Italy, Hungary, 
Austria, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland.28 Its goal was to reverse 
the EU’s open-door migration policies by changing the political 
composition of pro-immigration EU institutions, such as the European 
Parliament and European Commission, in the 2019 elections.29 The Anti-
Immigration Axis and other far-right parties made large gains in some 
countries during the European Parliament elections, but suffered losses in 
others.30 The undertaking was a moderate success, with far-right parties 
having more representation than in the past. These gains will also play a 
role in the make-up of the European Commission, which the members of 
the European Parliament must approve.31 In response to the Anti-
Immigration Axis’ formation, the European Parliament voted to initiate 
Article 7 sanction proceedings against Hungary because Hungary passed 
                                                        
24  Kern, supra note 19. 
25  BBC News, Italy Migrants: Matteo Salvini Calls For End to Sicily 'Refugee Camp', supra 
note 20. 
26  Id. The Italian economy has been declining since 2012. See also Shobhit Seth, All About the 
Italian Economic Crisis of 2018, INVESTOPEDIA (May 15, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/news/all-about-italian-economic-crisis-2018/.  It has one of the largest 
debts in Europe - over two trillion euros - and its unemployment rate has consistently been one of the 
highest in Western Europe. Id. 
27  Kern, supra note 19. 
28  Id. 
29  Id. The right-wing, anti-immigration axis is expected to make considerable gains in the 2019 
elections as xenophobic sentiments continue to dominate European politics. Paul Mason, Will the Far 
Right Triumph in Europe in 2019?, NEW STATESMAN AMERICA (Jan. 2, 2019), 
https://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/2019/01/will-far-right-triumph-europe-2019. The results 
of the parliament election are crucial because both the European Parliament and the European Council 
choose the President of the European Commission, who implements European policies like the Dublin 
Regulation. European Union, EU Presidents – Who Does What? (Nov. 10, 2017), 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/presidents_en.  
30  Shaun Walker, European Elections: Far-Right 'Surge' Ends in a Ripple, The Guardian (May 
27, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/27/european-elections-far-right-surge-ends-
in-a-ripple. 
31  Elena Sánchez Nicolás, The New European Commission: What's Next?, EU Observer (Sep. 
2, 2019), https://euobserver.com/institutional/145782. 












new anti-immigration legislation, abusing the rule of law.32 The 
proceedings could terminate Hungary’s EU voting rights.33 
While the crisis continues and the threat of disunity between the 
member states looms, there is hope for reform that will satisfy everyone 
involved. In his 2018 State of the Union address, the President of the 
European Commission propositioned several steps to assist member states 
with asylum procedures under the Dublin Regulation.34 Some proposals 
include increasing the EU Asylum Agency budget and deploying more 
Migration Management Support Teams, especially to migration “hotspots” 
                                                        
32  Michael Peel, Hungary Optimistic Over Swift End To ‘Absurd’ EU Rule-Of-Law Row, 
Financial Times (Sep. 29, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/8285162a-de16-11e9-9743-
db5a370481bc 
33  James McBride, Europe Wrestles With Hungary’s Populist Challenge, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/article/europe-wrestles-hungarys-populist-
challenge. See also Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community art. 7, December 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1. Article 7 of the 
EU’s founding treaty, the Lisbon Treaty, allows for disciplinary action on member states that threaten 
the EU’s values as outlined in Article 2 of the same title. Id. Article 7 mandates that 
1. On a reasoned proposal by one third of the Member States, by the 
European Parliament or by the European Commission, the Council, acting by a 
majority of four fifths of its members after obtaining the consent of the 
European Parliament, may determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach 
by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2. Before making such a 
determination, the Council shall hear the Member State in question and may 
address recommendations to it, acting in accordance with the same procedure.  
2. The Council shall regularly verify that the grounds on which such a 
determination was made continue to apply. The European Council, acting by 
unanimity on a proposal by one third of the Member States or by the 
Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may 
determine the existence of a serious and persistent breach by a Member State of 
the values referred to in Article 2, after inviting the Member State in question to 
submit its observations.  
3. Where a determination under paragraph 2 has been made, the Council, 
acting by a qualified majority, may decide to suspend certain of the rights 
deriving from the application of the Treaties to the Member State in question, 
including the voting rights of the representative of the government of that 
Member State in the Council. In doing so, the Council shall take into account 
the possible consequences of such a suspension on the rights and obligations of 
natural and legal persons. 
 Id. Article 7 has never been invoked before, which is why it has been coined the “nuclear option”. 
Ginger Harvey & Emmet Livingstone, What is Article 7, POLITICO (Jan. 13, 2016), 
https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-eu-news-article-7-vote-poland-rule-of-law/.  
34  European Commission, European Commission Audio-visual Services, State of the Union 















like Italy and Greece.35 In the meantime, the Dublin Regulation remains 
unchanged.36 The first part of this note will examine the Dublin Regulation 
and its role in the European migration crisis. The second part will discuss 
the issues with the Dublin Regulation. The third part of this note will 
propose remedies for these issues and analyze proposals put forth by 
politicians, organizations, and scholars. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The Dublin Regulation is a part of the EU’s common asylum system.37 
Before the EU enacted the Dublin Regulation, a major approach to 
migration was the Schengen Agreement signed in 1985 by Germany, 
France, and three other European countries.38 The Schengen Agreement 
removed any “obstacles to free movement at the common borders” of 
                                                        
35   Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Union Agency 
for Asylum and Repealing Regulation (EU) No 439/2010, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-eu-agency-asylum-regulation-
633_en.pdf. See also, European Commission, The Hotspot Approach to Managing 
Exceptional Migratory Flows, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-
do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/2_hotspots_en.pdf.  The term 
“hotspot country” is derived from the EU’s “hotspot approach”. The hotspot approach is defined as an 
approach where:  
[t]he European Asylum Support Office (EASO) , the European Border and 
Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) , Europol and Eurojust work on the ground with 
the authorities of frontline EU Member States which are facing disproportionate 
migratory pressures at the EU’s external borders to help to fulfil their 
obligations under EU law and swiftly identify, register and fingerprint incoming 
migrants. 
Id. 
36  Nikolaj Nielson, Commission bins 'Dublin' asylum-reform proposal, EU OBSERVER (Feb. 20, 
2020), https://euobserver.com/migration/147511. 
37  European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, Common European Asylum System, 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum_en. The Common European Asylum 
System is a European policy initiative that puts in place uniform minimum standards for asylum in the 
EU. Id. Aside from the Dublin Regulation, the European Refugee Fund (which was later replaced by 
the Migration and Integration Fund) and the Family Reunification Directive have come out of the 
policy. Id. See Regulation 516/2014, 2014 O.J. (L 150) 168 available at https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/financing/fundings/pdf/overview/regulation_eu_no_5162014_of_the_eur
opean_parliament_and_of_the_council_en.pdf (establishing the Asylum, Migration and Integration 
fund); Council Directive 2003/86, 2003 O.J. (L 251) 12 available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32003L0086&from=EN (extending the right to family 
reunification to refugees). 
38  Agreement Between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their 
Common Borders, 14 June 1985, O.J. (L 239) , 22/09/2000 13-18 [hereinafter Schengen Agreement], 
available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:42000A0922(01).  For 
further information on the history of the Schengen Agreement, see Schengen Visa Info, Schengen 
Agreement (Oct. 18 2018), https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/schengen-agreement/.  












European countries.39  The Schengen Agreement regulates internal 
migration.40 The Dublin Regulation provided a solution for regulating 
migration originating in non-EU countries. It specifically regulates asylum 
applications from migrants seeking protection under the Geneva 
Convention, which outlines the rights of refugees and the obligations 
member states have to them.41 
The Dublin Regulation was originally enacted by the EU in 1990.42 
One of the Dublin Regulation’s main functions is to determine which 
member state is responsible for an asylum application.43 Assigning 
responsibility to member states ensures that migrants are not in “orbit” 
because no member state will accept responsibility for his or her asylum 
application.44 Should a member state determine that it is not responsible 
for an asylum seeker’s application, the Dublin Regulation gives the 
member state the authority to return that asylum seeker to the member 
state that is actually responsible for their application.45  
One of the Dublin Regulation’s primary goals is to stop “asylum 
shopping,” which is when asylum seekers submit asylum applications to 
member states with the most attractive benefits or member states more 
likely to accept them.46 Instead of member states with weaker asylum 
systems and less opportunities being the ones overburdened with asylum 
applications, member states with stronger asylum systems and greater 
                                                        
39  Schengen Agreement, O.J. (L 239) 13. 
40  Id.  
41  For more information on the Geneva Convention, see Summary of the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 and Their Additional Protocols, American Red Cross (April 2011), 
https://www.redcross.org/content/dam/redcross/atg/PDF_s/International_Services/International_Huma
nitarian_Law/IHL_SummaryGenevaConv.pdf. 
42  European Council, Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining 
Applications for Asylum Lodged in One of the Member States of the European Communities 
(Deposited with the Government of Ireland) (June 15, 1990), 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/treaties-
agreements/agreement/?id=1990090. 
43 Regulation 604/2013, supra note 9, at 42. 
44   European Council on Refugees and Exiles, The Road Out of Dublin: Reform of the Dublin 
Regulation, https://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Policy-Note-02.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 
2019). 
45  The process of sending a migrant back to the member state that is responsible for it is called 
a Dublin Transfer. European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, Dublin Transfer, 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/content/dublin-transfer_en (last visited Nov. 5, 2019). If the request 
for a Dublin Transfer is accepted, a “reasoned decision stating that the application is inadmissible in 
the State in which it was lodged and that there is the obligation to transfer the asylum seeker to the 
Member State responsible,” must be sent to the applicant. European Court of Human Rights, Dublin 
Cases, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Dublin_ENG.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2019). 













opportunities will be overburdened as asylum applicants flock to them.47 
Asylum shopping leads to the opposite problem of the present system: 
potential increased strain on member states with the best benefits, like 
Germany.48 At some point, those asylum systems will not be able to 
sustain the amount of migrants that apply there. They will end up with 
failing facilities and little funds, just like the asylum systems that migrants 
initially tried to avoid in the first place.49    
Another goal was to prevent asylum seekers from submitting multiple 
applications to several member states with the hopes of increasing their 
chances of having their applications accepted or having many member 
states to choose from.50 When asylum applicants do this, the system 
becomes backed up with duplicate applications, slowing down the asylum 
process for everyone.51 In addition, it causes confusion since it is nearly 
impossible to figure out which member state is actually responsible for an 
asylum applicant who has submitted an application in more than one 
member state.52  
The Dublin Regulation also sought to prevent member states from 
denying protection and pushing responsibility for asylum seekers onto 
other member states.53 The principal of non-refoulement, or the refusal to 
send any asylum seeker to a state where he or she faces persecution, is 
recurrent in the Dublin Regulation.54 For example, the Dublin Regulation 
requires that a Dublin Transfer must be precluded if substantial grounds 
show that an asylum seeker faces an actual risk of torture or inhumane 
                                                        
47  Id. at 11-13 
48  Infra note 161. 
49  See infra text accompanying notes 85-87 and 95-104. 
50  FRATZKE, supra note 15, at 4. 
51  Lauren Moses, The Deficiencies of Dublin: An Analysis of the Dublin System in the 
European Union, 6 JACKSON SCH. J. 6, 8 (Spring 2016). 
52  Id. at 6.  
53  FRATZKE, supra note 15, at 4. 
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treatment in the receiving state.55 Non-refoulement protects asylum 
seekers from being sent to another member state arbitrarily.56  
Since its enactment, the Dublin Convention, the original name of the 
regulation, has been reformed twice.57 The latest reform, known as Dublin 
Regulation III, sought to increase the efficiency of the regulation and to 
ensure the needs of asylum seekers are met.58 The European Parliament 
and Council of the European Union hoped to further the reach of the 
Common European Asylum System (CEAS) by enacting Dublin 
Regulation III.59 The Dublin Regulation III somewhat achieved these goals 
in various ways. First, it addresses the pressure put on migration 
“hotspots” by establishing the European Asylum Support Office under 
CEAS, which provides asylum support teams through the Asylum 
Intervention Pool.60 Second, it ensures free legal counsel for asylum 
seekers.61 Third, it imposes strict limitations on the duration of detention 
                                                        
55  Pernilla Nordvall, The Legality of Dublin Transfers 15-16 (2015) (unpublished B.A, thesis, 
Lund University) (on file with Lund University Publications, Lund University); Regulation 604/2013, 
supra note 9, at 37; See also, T.I. v. the United Kingdom, 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 435 at 18 (stating that 
a member state requesting a Dublin Transfer must take “appropriate regard to the existence of 
adequate safeguards . . . to avoid the risk of any inhuman or degrading treatment,” in the requested 
member state), K.R.S. v. the United Kingdom, 2008-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 15 (holding that “in the absence 
of any proof to the contrary, it [is] to be presumed that [a requesting member state] would comply with 
its obligation to make the right of any returnee to lodge an application with the Court under Article 34 
of the Convention . . . both practical and effective in respect of returnees . . .”). 
56  Marlene L. Hakkebo, Compliance of the Dublin Regulation with the Principle of Non-
Refoulement, UNIV. OF OSLO (2013), 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/dedf/41b793f5e54b205d1262c41d4e42753966b0.pdf, at 21. 
57  See Regulation 604/2013, supra note 9; Regulation 343/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 50) 1, available 
at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32003R0343&from=EN. See 
also Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in 




58 UK VISAS AND IMMIGRATION, DUBLIN III REGULATION 6 (2017, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/6566
66/dublin-III-regulation-v1_0.pdf.  
59  Regulation 604/2013, supra note 9, at 31-32. See also EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, The 
Implementation of the Common European Asylum System at 23 (May 2016), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/556953/IPOL_STU(2016)556953_EN.pd
f. 
60  Regulation 604/2013, supra note 9. See also Regulation 439/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 132) 11 
available at https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:132:0011:0028:EN:PDF (establishing the 
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in refugee camps and centers.62 This list is not exhaustive.63 Despite these 
changes, actual implementation has varied depending on the member state, 
leading to inefficient and divergent results.64   
In 2014, a year after the Dublin Regulation was reformed, Europe 
experienced a surge of migrants entering its borders, many of whom were 
seeking asylum.65 The migrants were mainly from Middle Eastern 
countries, especially Syria and Afghanistan.66 The increase in migrants 
from Syria, who made up thirty-nine percent of migrants, stemmed from 
socio-political oppression in Syria.67 Similarly, constant war and 
persecution have been cited as the causes of high numbers of Afghan 
migrants to the EU.68 Migrants also came from countries in Africa, 
particularly Eritrea.69 
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63  See, e.g., id.  
64  See European Commission, Evaluation of the Implementation of the Dublin III Regulation – 
Final Report (Mar.18, 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-
do/policies/asylum/examination-of-
applicants/docs/evaluation_of_the_implementation_of_the_dublin_iii_regulation_en.pdf. For example, 
the organizational structure of authorities dealing with Dublin Regulation cases differs in nearly every 
member state because the Dublin Regulation itself is silent on this issue. The many steps of an asylum 
procedure, including screening, conducting interviews, preparing and submitting transfer requests and 
implementing those transfers, are carried out by each member state in various ways. Id.  
65  See Jeanne Park, Europe’s Migration Crisis, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Sept. 23, 
2015), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/europes-migration-crisis. See also EUR. PARL. MEMBER’S 
RESEARCH SERV., Asylum in the EU: Facts and Figures (2015), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/551332/EPRS_BRI%282015%29551332_
EN.pdf.  
66  EUR. PARL, supra note 59, at 2.  
67  Park, supra note 65. Syrians were escaping from civil war in Syria. By 2015, the civil war in 
Syria had been raging for nearly five years. The conflict had left more than one hundred thousand 
people dead and millions displaced. Further, the war has destroyed the Syrian economy and 
proliferated hyperinflation, making life for Syrian citizens miserable and unsustainable. For more 
background on the Syrian Civil War, see Zachary Laub, Syria’s Crisis and the Global Response, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Sept. 11, 2013), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/syrias-crisis-
and-global-response.  
68  See, e.g., Park, supra note 65. Afghanistan, the source of the second largest group of 
migrants entering Europe, has been at war for over four decades. Crippling poverty and a lack of 
opportunity has driven millions of Afghans to seek refuge in Europe.  For more information on the 
crisis in Afghanistan, see Matthew Willner- Reid, Afghanistan: Displacement Challenges in a Country 
on the Move, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/afghanistan-
displacement-challenges-country-move.  
69  BBC NEWS, supra note 3. See generally Human Rights Council Rep. of the Detailed 
Findings of the Comm’n of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea 409A/HRC/29/CRP. 
Eritreans were fleeing gross human rights violations in Eritrea, including forced labor and 
imprisonment, under a totalitarian government.  












The number of migrants more than doubled from 562,680 in 2014 to 
over 1.2 million in 2015.70 Member states such as Italy, Greece and 
Hungary were overburdened by this increase because of their geographic 
proximity to many of the source countries.71 These member states were 
often the state of first entry for migrants.72 These countries were also 
identified as “hotspots” requiring extra assistance from the European 
Asylum Support System through the Dublin Regulation.73  
Greece saw a 750% increase in the number of migrants entering the 
country from 2014 to 2015 because of its being a country on Europe’s 
border with easy access to the rest of Europe.74 Nearly all those arriving on 
Greek shores were fleeing Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan.75 As migrants 
continued to flow onto the Greek islands, resources dwindled.76 Refugee 
camps were described as filthy and falling apart, with many refugees 
having no roof over their heads.77 Children were also at a high risk of 
being exploited and catching disease because of the inadequate facilities.78  
At the same time, Greece was recovering from its own financial crisis that 
plunged the country into staggering debt just a few years prior.79 The crisis 
left Greece unable to adequately provide shelter and necessities for 
                                                        
70  Eurostat, Record Number of Over 1.2 Million First Time Asylum Seekers Registered in 2015 
(Mar. 4, 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7203832/3-04032016-AP-
EN.pdf/790eba01-381c-4163-bcd2-a54959b99ed6. 
71  Park, supra note 65. 
72  Id.  
73  See note 35 and the accompanying text. 
74  Matina Stevis & Manuela Mesco, How Money, Race and Religion Determine the Fate of 
Europe-Bound Migrants, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 16, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/for-migrants-
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75  Migrant 'Chaos' on Greek Islands - UN Refugee Agency, BBC NEWS (Aug. 7, 2015), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33818193.  
76  Niki Kitsantonis, Greece’s Biggest Migrant Camp Is a Mental Health Crisis, Aid Groups 
Say, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/25/world/europe/greece-migrant-
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77  Joanna Kakissis, ‘Europe Does Not See Us As Human’: Stranded Refugees Struggle in 
Greece, NPR (Mar. 9, 2018, 5:01 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2018/03/09/589973165/europe-does-not-see-us-as-human-
stranded-refugees-struggle-in-greece.  
78  Migrant ‘Chaos’ on Greek Islands- UN Refugee Agency, supra note 75.  
79  The Greek economy collapsed in 2009 due to excessive regulation, which prevented 
domestic growth. Rachael E. De Orio, Note, Seeking Sanctuary Across the Sea: Why the Influx of 
Refugees and Asylum Seekers to Greece Requires Major Policy Changes, 41 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. 
REV. 51, 60, 60 n.25 (2018).  Ongoing corruption, like political parties pumping borrowed money into 
the public sector to gain political support, buried the country in debt. Id. at 60-61. The Greek 
government seemed to turn a blind eye to the crumbling economy. For more background on Greece’s 













migrants.80 In 2015, several EU member states closed their borders to 
migrants, leaving many stranded in Greece and other border states.81 
Closing off these borders also proliferated the decrease in housing and 
other resources that migrants needed.82 The Greek asylum system was also 
burdened, because it was understaffed.83 As a result, asylum applications 
were often delayed and the process was lengthy.84   
Greece has been criticized for its management of the migrant crisis, 
specifically the condition of migrant camps and detention centers.85 In 
2016, the European Commission made recommendations that Greece fully 
implement the Dublin Regulation and comply with its standards after the 
European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) and the European Court of 
Justice (“ECJ”) found evidence of human rights violations within the 
Greek asylum system.86 These recommendations included establishing 
“open reception facilities” that are in adequate condition, ensuring that the 
Greek asylum system is adequately staffed, and providing access to free 
legal aid.87 
Many of the migrants entering Hungary came in through Serbia, which 
is not an EU member state, making Hungary the first country of entry 
under the Dublin Regulation for hundreds of thousands of migrants.88  
After experiencing an over massive increase in asylum seekers in 2015, 
the Hungarian government built a four-meter-high fence on its border with 
Serbia.89  Later that year, it built another fence along its border with 
                                                        
80  Press Release, United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, UNHCR Warns of Deepening 
Refugee Crisis in Greece and Calls for Urgent and Bold Action (Aug. 7, 2015), 
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2015/8/55c48ea69/unhcr-warns-deepening-refugee-crisis-
greece-calls-urgent-bold-action.html.  
81  Sarah Almukhtar, Josh Keller & Derek Watkins, Closing the Back Door to Europe, N.Y. 
TIMES (lasted updated Oct. 16, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/09/15/world/europe/migrant-borders-europe.html. 
Hungary, Bulgaria and a few others closed their borders by erecting fences and using other means to 
stifle irregular migration. 
82  Kakissis, supra note 77. 
83  Id. 
84   Id. 
85  De Orio, supra note 79, at 51, 82-83. The European Court of Human Rights held Greece was 
in violation of Dublin Regulation Article III’s prohibition of degrading treatment because of the 
asylum seeker’s detention and living conditions. M.S.S. v. Belgium, 2011-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 255, 354-
355.  
86 European Commission Press Release IP/16/2182, Commission Adopts Second 
Recommendation Identifying Steps to Restore Dublin Transfers to Greece, (June 15, 2016).  
87  Id. 
88  Park, supra note 65. 
89  Marton Dunai, Hungary to Fence off Border with Serbia to Stop Migrants, REUTERS (June 
17, 2015, 6:02 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-immigration/hungary-to-fence-off-
 












Croatia.90  In early 2016, Hungary declared a state of emergency, which it 
later extended into 2018,91 and tightened its border control after both 
Serbia and Croatia closed their borders to migrants.92  The reasoning 
behind these actions include the EU’s failure to create a better plan for 
dealing with the influx of migrants and Greece’s failure to stem the 
amount of migrants entering through Greece, many of which travel on 
from Greece to Hungary.93 In addition, Hungary has defended its actions 
in the name of protecting its Christian roots since many of the migrants are 
Muslim, whom Hungarians believe bring an increased threat of 
terrorism.94  
Italy, another major “hotspot,” saw a sharp increase in migrants starting 
in 2014.95 Migrants traveled to Italy through the Central Mediterranean 
passage, which became the most popular route to Europe.96 Migrants 
taking this route usually bought their way onto tiny, smuggler-provided 
boats costing upwards of $5,000.97 Thousands of migrants died at sea 
especially after Italy’s Mare Nostrum, a search-and-rescue program, was 
                                                                                                                              
border-with-serbia-to-stop-migrants-idUSKBN0OX17I20150617. The Schengen Borders Code allows 
member states to temporarily reintroduce internal border controls when there is a serious threat to 
public policy or internal security. European Comm’n, Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control, 
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emergency due to mass migration (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-
interior/news/hungarian-government-declares-state-of-emergency-due-to-mass-migration. 
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93  Park, supra note 65. 
94  Steven Erlanger & Dan Bilefsky, Migrant Chaos Mounts While Divided Europe Stumbles for 
Response, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/world/europe/hungary-
train-station-migrant-crisis.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=a-lede-package-
region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0.  See also Nick Thorpe, Migrant Crisis: Hungary 
Denies Fueling Intolerance in Media, BBC NEWS (Dec. 22, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-35162515.  Hostility towards Muslims also manifested itself amongst Hungarian citizens who, 
in a survey conducted by the Median agency, voiced their fear of Muslims would become the majority 
in Europe and “impose their religion” on Europeans. Id. 
95  Press Release, Int’l Org. for Migration, Migrant Arrivals by Sea in Italy Top 170,000 in 
2014, (Jan. 16, 2015), https://www.iom.int/news/migrant-arrivals-sea-italy-top-170000-2014.  
96  Park, supra note 65. 













shut down and replaced with Operation Triton.98 Like Greece, Italy 
received a large amount of migrants because of its close proximity to 
Africa and the Middle East. However, migrants from Eritrea, Nigeria and 
sub-Saharan Africa made up the majority of migrants entering Italy.99 In 
an effort to stem the number of arrivals, especially migrants attempting to 
reach Italy in smuggling boats, the Italian Government has worked out an 
agreement with the Libyan Government to voluntarily return migrants who 
do not qualify for asylum back to their home countries, even though 
migrants were escaping inhumane conditions in both Libya and their 
original countries. 100  
Italian detention centers have also been cited for human rights 
violations by several human rights organizations, including Amnesty 
International.101 In fact, the ECHR held in Khlaifia  v. Italy that Italy 
violated articles three through five of the European Convention on Human 
Rights when it detained migrants in unacceptable conditions at one of its 
detention centers and then sent them all back to Tunisia without examining 
every individual’s case.102  Migrants have also reported that officials in the 
detention centers used force and torture to get them to provide fingerprints 
mandated by the Dublin Regulation.103 In 2018, Italy’s Interior Minister 
began to block entry into Italy by migrants, challenging the EU to reform 
its policies so that border member states are not overburdened with the 
migrant crisis.104 
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https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/europe/italy. 
102  Khlaifia vs. Italy, App. No. 16483/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2016).  
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OF REFUGEE AND MIGRANT RIGHTS 6 (2016), AMNESTY INT’L, 
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In 2016, the European Commission responded to the migrant crisis by 
proposing to revise the Dublin Regulation a fourth time in what would be 
called “Dublin Regulation IV.”105 The aim of the proposed recast is to 
reduce the number of migrants seeking refuge in the EU.106 Dublin 
Regulation IV would implement stricter rules for migrants, including 
stringent sanctions on migrants when they travel to EU Member States 
illegally.107 These rules are geared towards discouraging migrants from 
going to other member states and trying to file more than one asylum 
application or from coming to the EU in the first place because strict rules 
will prevent them from going to their preferred member state.108 Another 
proposal, advanced by the European Parliament, is to establish a central 
asylum application collection effort.109 Under this proposal, an asylum 
seeker’s application would be for protection provided by the EU and not 
by an individual member state.110 From there, a central system would 
allocate responsibility to a specific member state.111 Dublin IV Regulation 
has faced disapproval from advisory committees, national parliaments, and 
other stakeholders for being “inadequate,”  not in compliance with certain 
principles, and for other shortcomings.112 According to its critics, the 
Dublin Regulation IV fails to take into account the preferences of migrants 
and the conditions they face in certain member states.113 Others, 
particularly Italy, Hungary and other eastern European member states, 
prefer a more local process over a centralized one.114 Disagreement over 
the Dublin Regulation IV has prevented it from moving forward and 
becoming law.115  
In addition to proposing a recast of the Dublin Regulation, the EU 
government has attempted to mediate the crisis in a number of other ways. 
In 2015, EU governments agreed to resettle 120,000 migrants from Italy 
                                                        
105 European Commission, Examination of Applicants, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-
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and Greece in twenty-three other member states.116 The resettlement, 
although hotly contested by five member states, was set to take place over 
a period of two years.117 The European Commission later conceded that 
the relocation effort “was not working”.118 Another controversial scheme 
is the “hotspot” approach.119 While the “hotspot” approach identified 
member states in need of assistance with irregular migratory flows and 
sent aid in various forms to those member states, it is still rife with 
flaws.120  
II. PROBLEM 
The migration crisis has clearly had a strong impact on both the 
migrants seeking a better life in the EU and the EU member states, 
particularly Greece, Hungary, and Italy.121  The Dublin Regulation is often 
blamed for many of the issues surrounding the migrant crisis.122 First, it 
fails to protect migrants entering the EU seeking asylum.123 Secondly, it is 
inequitable in its distribution of responsibility for asylum applications 
amongst member states, leaving just a few member states to handle the 
bulk of the work associated with the migrant crisis.124 Third, the Dublin 
Regulation is overly expensive and its benefits do not appear to exceed its 
benefits.  
The Dublin Regulation guarantees that every asylum seeker’s 
application will be reviewed.125 However, many asylum seekers wait up to 
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six months before their applications are reviewed, which is a direct 
contradiction of the Dublin Regulation’s objective of “rapid processing of 
applications for international protection.”126 The Dublin Regulation slows 
down the asylum process because for every application filed, it must be 
determined what member state is responsible for it and whether, if 
applicable, a Dublin Transfer is needed.127 Further, some member states 
treat certain groups differently when examining their asylum applications, 
leading to vastly different results based on where the application is filed.128 
For example, Syrian asylum seekers filing an application in Italy or 
Germany were granted asylum over ninety percent of the time in 2015.129 
On the other hand, those filing an application in Hungary were only 
successful about sixty percent of the time.130 These results hurt the 
migrants seeking asylum because they have very little say in where they 
must file an application and thus must put their fates in the hands of 
whatever country they happen to enter first.131  
Human rights violations such as detainment in dilapidated migrant 
centers, separation of family members, inadequate protection for children, 
and lack of healthcare for the ill are prevalent in a number of member 
states, especially in the hotspots of Italy and Greece. 132 The Dublin 
Regulation proliferates this treatment because it overburdens hotspot 
member states who cannot financially support building more adequate 
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facilities or provide healthcare for all of the migrants.133 These member 
states are forced to crowd migrants into detention centers beyond their 
capacity.134 While the EU has supplied aid in the form of funding and 
staffing, it has not been enough to keep up with the demand.135   
Because migrants are made aware that the country of first entry (i.e. the 
country where they are first fingerprinted) is the member state that will be 
responsible for their asylum application under the Dublin Regulation, the 
migrants may avoid this process by traveling to other countries in order to 
get to their preferred Member State or not going through the legal asylum 
process at all..136 This leaves them unprotected from human trafficking and 
other exploitations.137 Criminal networks play a major role in the 
exploitation of migrants attempting to get around being fingerprinted in 
the country of first entry.138 Criminal organizations provide migrants with 
fake documents that allow them to travel to and work in other countries, 
but often at a hefty price.139 These criminal organizations often use 
blackmail and threats to control the migrants they help enter illegally.140 
When a migrant cannot pay right away, these organizations hold a debt 
over their heads. 141 Another service criminal organizations provide is 
                                                        
133  See supra text accompanying notes 25-26, 79-81, 101-104.  
134  Jon Henley, EU's Migrant Centres Could Breach Human Rights, Say Campaigners, 
GUARDIAN (June 29, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/29/eus-migrant-centres-
could-breach-human-rights-say-campaigners; See also European Court of Auditors, EU Response to 
the Refugee Crisis: the ‘Hotspot’ Approach, at 27 (June 2017), 
https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR17_6/SR_MIGRATION_HOTSPOTS_EN.pdf 
(reporting on the overcrowded, desolate migrant centers in Greece). The centers in Greece are so 
inadequate that migrants have been forced to create makeshift dwellings around the centers. For 
example, Moria, Greece’s largest detention center faces closure amid reports that it holds nearly triple 
its official capacity of 2,000. Public health inspectors reported high risks of disease transmission 
because of the conditions at the center. The UN Refugee Agency has attempted to step in by 
recommending that Greece transfer some of the migrants to mainland Greece. UNHCR Briefing Notes, 
UNHCR urges Greece to Address Overcrowded Reception Centres on Aegean Islands (Aug. 31, 2018) 
(summarizing the conditions at Moria and recommendations for Greece). 
135  See Matteo Garavoglia, Why Europe Can’t Handle the Migration Crisis, BROOKINGS (Oct. 
5, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/10/05/why-europe-cant-handle-the-
migration-crisis/. 
136  MCDONOUGH, supra note 125, at 16. 
137  Id. 
138  Eliza Galos, Laura Bartolini, Harry Cook & Naomi Grant, Migrant Vulnerability to Human 
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transportation to other member states.142 The methods of transport used 
often carry health risks.143 
Although one of the Dublin Regulation’s aims was to promote member 
state solidarity and equitable distribution of responsibility for asylum 
applications, it has done the opposite.144 Member states along Europe’s 
southern and eastern borders saw more migrants entering than leaving 
their countries, as compared to the more interior states, which saw more 
migrants leaving through Dublin transfers than entering. 145 Allowing 
member states to send back migrants to their original country of entry 
exacerbates the pressure on hotspot countries because even without the 
transfers, they must deal with an extraordinary amount of incoming 
migrants.146 In 2015, for example, Italy received almost 25,000 transfer 
requests from other countries.147 The large number of external transfer 
requests reflects Italy’s inability to handle the amount of migrants entering 
the country, as many of them were able to leave Italy and apply for asylum 
elsewhere without being registered and fingerprinted.148 
                                                        
142  Id. at 5. See also Vladimir Banic and Saphora Smith, Inside Europe's People-Smuggling 
Networks: A journey from Afghanistan to Germany, NBC NEWS (July 19, 2018), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/inside-europe-s-people-smuggling-networks-journey-
afghanistan-germany-n888926 (detailing the journey of a migrant who was smuggled from one 
member state to another to reach his intended destination). The billion-dollar smuggling industry often 
uses trucks to transport migrants between member states. The trucks are usually packed with migrants 
who do not always survive the trip. See Carlo Angerer and Alastair Jamieson, 71 Dead Refugees 
Found in Truck on Austria Highway: Officials, NBC NEWS (Aug. 28, 2015), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/europes-border-crisis/71-dead-refugees-found-truck-austria-
highway-officials-n417536 (migrants smuggled in a refrigerated truck are abandoned and left to die); 
Migrant Truck Crash Kills 22 in Turkey, VOA NEWS (Oct. 14, 2018), 
https://www.voanews.com/a/migrants-killed-when-truck-plunges-into-river-in-turkey/4612762.html 
(truck accident kills several migrants smuggled from Turkey).  
143  Galos, supra note 138, at 5. 
144  Fransje Molenaar, Irregular migration to the EU, in CLINGENDAEL STATE OF THE UNION 
2018: TOWARDS BETTER EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 48 (Jan. 2018), available at 
https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2018-
01/Report_Clingendael__State_of_the_Union_2018.pdf. 
145  MCDONOUGH, supra note 125, at 13. 
146  Id. 
147  Andreas Høglund, The Implementation of the Dublin Regulations in Greece, Italy and Spain 
1, 61 (2017) (unpublished Master thesis, University of Bergen) (on file with Bergen Open Research 
Archive, University of Bergen).  
148  See id. at 61. Migrants must be fingerprinted when applying for asylum in the EU. Chloe 
Lyneham, EU's Migrant Fingerprinting System EURODAC Under Review, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Sep. 
11, 2017), https://www.dw.com/en/eus-migrant-fingerprinting-system-eurodac-under-review/a-
41311572. The fingerprints are then stored in the EURODAC central system to avoid asylum shopping 
and multiple applications from an asylum seeker. It also determines which member state is responsible 
for an applicant. Id. Incoming migrants avoid being fingerprinted in order to travel on to another 














Hotspot countries also tend to be countries with the least developed 
asylum systems and the least wealth149 amongst the member states.150 This 
is evidence that these particular member states are burdened not only 
because of the number of entering migrants, but because they simply 
cannot afford to support the large number of migrants and are unprepared 
to do so.151 The EU sends assistance to hotspot countries in the form of 
identification, registration, and removal assistance through FRONTEX 
(The European Border and Coast Guard Agency); assists with the 
registration of asylum claims, preparation of files, and relocation of 
asylum seekers through EASO (European Asylum Support Office); and 
helps investigate and prosecute crimes through EUROPOL (European 
Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation) and EUROJUST. 152 
However, the aid the EU has provided so far has not been enough.153  
The Dublin Regulation attempted to stop migrants from applying for 
asylum in more than one member state by making the country of first entry 
responsible for applicants.154 Migrants are still applying in more than one 
                                                                                                                              
damaged their fingers, sometimes by burning them, in order to appear as a new person. Andrew 
Higgins, Migrants Who Survived Shipwreck Are Grateful, but Disillusioned, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/08/world/europe/migrants-europe-lampedusa-sinking.html. 
See also FRONTEX, Risk Analysis for 2016, (2016), 
https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annula_Risk_Analysis_2016.pdf 
(outlining the difficulties border states encounter in fingerprinting and registering incoming migrants).  
149  See also Garavoglia supra note 135. 
150  Høglund, supra note 147, at 61.  
151  Id. 
152  Frontex, the EU’s Border and Coast Guard Agency, instituted Operation Triton in 2014 to 
assist Italy with rescuing migrants at sea. It also coordinated requests to other member states for 
aircraft and patrol vessel donations as well as staff to help with the rescue effort. See Memorandum 
from the European Comm. on Frontex Joint Operation 'Triton' – Concerted Efforts to Manage 
Migration in the Cent. Mediterranean (Oct. 7, 2014) (on file with author). EASO is an agency created 
by the Dublin II Regulation to enhance CEAS. It helps member states with the asylum process by 
providing practical, technical, and operational support. About Us, EASO, 
https://www.easo.europa.eu/about-us (last visited Jan. 12, 2019). EUROPOL’s central role during the 
crisis has been investigating migrant smuggling, which manifests itself in the form of false 
documentation, visa free travel and more, and is still rampant in 2018.  In 2016, EUROPOL 
established the European Migrant Smuggling Centre to support “cross-border investigations to disrupt 
and prosecute organised crime groups.” Press Release, European Union Agency for Law Enforcement 
Cooperation, All You Need To Know About Migrant Smuggling in the EU (Apr. 20, 2018) (on file 
with author). EUROJUST is an EU agency composed of prosecutors, magistrates and law enforcement 
agents from each member state. Its primary goal is to investigate and prosecute serious organized 
crimes. History of EUROJUST, EUROJUST, 
http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/about/background/Pages/history.aspx.  
153  See Garavoglia supra note 135. 
154  See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.  












country though, despite the Dublin Regulation’s rules.155 The result is 
“inefficiencies, duplicate files, delays and additional costs.”156 Lodging 
multiple applications in multiple countries is also often perceived as abuse 
of the asylum system and consequently reduces political and public 
support for providing asylum.157  
Critics charge the Dublin Regulation with ignoring the migrants’ 
wishes and therefore being inefficient.158 Migrants often have a preference 
based on language, whether they know people in the member state, and 
job prospects.159 Differences in reception in each member state also 
influence migrants’ wishes.160 Migrants are well aware of the conditions in 
border countries like Italy and Greece and often attempt to go to countries 
like Germany where migrants and refugees are more readily recognized by 
the government and where there are more opportunities.161 The Dublin 
                                                        
155  Anja Radjenovic, Secondary Movements of Asylum- Seekers In The EU Asylum System, 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERVICE (Oct. 2017), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/608728/EPRS_BRI(2017)608728_EN.pdf 
(statistics for 2016 show that the number of migrants submitting multiple applications increased from 
2015). 
156  Id. at 3. 
157  U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Onward Movement of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees: 
Discussion paper prepared for the Expert Roundtable on Onward Movement 1-2 (2015), 
http://www.unhcr.org/562f81c39.pdf.  
158  Mascareñas, supra note 131. Critics also dub the Dublin Regulation as coercive at its core 
with high human costs for migrants seeking asylum. Ska Keller et al.,The Green Alternative 
to the Dublin System: A Preference Based Allocation System for Asylum Seekers Within the EU 3 
(Feb. 2016), https://www.skakeller.de/fileadmin/material/Migration/pdf/DublinPaper_2016_EN.pdf. 
Even though the Dublin Regulation states that family and social ties will be taken into account, the 
decision to accept an asylum seeker is ultimately a subjective one based on the preferences of the 
member states. Id. at 3-4; see also Regulation 604/2013, supra note 9 at 39., at 39 (stating that 
Member states should take into account family and social ties). The Greens, a political group within 
the EU Parliament, has suggested treating migrants more like people, rather than goods being 
transported across state lines by creating a Dublin Regulation that is built around migrants’ 
preferences. Keller, supra. 
159  Mascareñas, supra note 131, at 2. 
160  Jan-Paul Brekke and Grete Brochmann, Stuck in Transit: Secondary Migration of Asylum 
Seekers in Europe, National Differences, and the Dublin Regulation, 28 J. REFUGEE STUD. 145 (2015). 
Integrating a largely minority and Muslim population into many European countries is one of the 
biggest difficulties imposed by the migrant crisis. See Park, supra note 65. European citizens in 
countries like Denmark and France have expressed concern over the admittance of Middle Eastern and 
African migrants after the terrorist shootings in Paris and Copenhagen in early 2015. Id. Other 
countries have shown a strong preference for non-Muslim migrants. Slovakia announced that it would 
only accept Christian refugees in 2015. Id. Both Hungary and Poland have also used anti-Muslim 
rhetoric in describing the criteria used for asylum decisions. Id. See also supra text accompanying note 
90.  
161  Germany is one of the most desired member states for migrants. Germany has the largest 
economy in Europe and the second lowest unemployment rate, making it an easy economic choice. 














Regulation incorrectly assumes that migrants are indifferent to where they 
are granted asylum.162  
Finally, the Dublin Regulation is very expensive.163 The Dublin 
Regulation incurs several direct and indirect costs.164 Some of its direct 
administrative and procedural costs include staff, IT systems such as 
EURODAC, migrant transfers, and court fees.165 Indirect costs are 
comprised of accommodations, healthcare, and return fees for denied 
asylum applications.166 The overall costs were estimated to be one billion 
euros in 2014.167 While it is difficult to determine the exact costs imposed 
by the Dublin Regulation on a country-by-country basis,168 the evidence 









                                                                                                                              
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-20180511-1?inheritRedirect=true; 
Unemployment Statistics, EUROSTAT (Nov. 2018) https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics. Germany’s Asylum-Seekers' Benefits Act requires it to 
provide food, healthcare accommodations, clothes, and “essential personal needs”. 
Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz [AsylbLG] [Asylum-Seekers’ Benefits Act], Jun. 30, 1993, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBI.] at 57 2022 (Ger.). See also Rebecca Staudenmaier, Refugee Benefits in 
Germany are 'Quite High,' Interior Minister de Maiziere Says, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Sept. 9, 2017), 
https://www.dw.com/en/refugee-benefits-in-germany-are-quite-high-interior-minister-de-maiziere-
says/a-40426704.  
162  Mascareñas, supra note 131. 
163  Id.  
164  Sheila Maas et. al., Evaluation of the Dublin III Regulation 1, 11 (Dec. 4, 2015), 
 https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-
do/policies/asylum/examination-of-applicants/docs/evaluation_of_the_dublin_iii_regulation_en.pdf.  
165  Id. at 11. Dublin Transfers are the most expensive part of the Dublin Regulation, with 
escorted/supervised transfers being the costliest form of transport. See Fratzke, supra note 15, at 15.  
166  Maas, supra note 164. Member states that detain migrants regularly have higher costs than 
those that do not.  Fratzke, supra note 15, at 16. Further, detention costs make up one of the highest 
expenditures for member states that utilize detention centers. Id.  
167  Maas, supra note 164, at 11.  
168  Fratzke, supra note 15, at 15-16. 
169  See also Garavoglia supra note 135. 













 The Dublin Regulation should be reformed a fourth time because it 
does not conform with the EU’s migration goals.170 In addition, the “state 
of first entry” rule should be invalidated because it places an unfair burden 
on a minority of member states.171 In its place, a new rule that equitably 
distributes responsibility should be enacted. For there to be equitable 
distribution, the reformed Dublin Regulation should give each member 
state a minimum number or percentage of asylum seekers it is responsible 
for based on the ability of its asylum system to meet the needs of asylum 
seekers, the member state’s wealth, and the overall number of migrants 
entering the EU.  
These factors are appropriate for determining a member state’s 
responsibility for a number of reasons. First, a country with an efficient 
asylum system is better equipped to assist migrants.172 It follows that, 
those member states can probably support more migrants than other 
member states. Second, as has been seen in Greece, a country’s wealth 
effects both the country’s reception of migrants as well as the efficiency of 
its asylum system.173 Wealthier countries, who in the past took on less 
responsibility than less wealthy countries, should be responsible for a 
larger share of the migrants entering Europe and applying for asylum.174 
Finally, the overall number of migrants entering the EU should be a factor, 
because this number has fluctuated over the past few years.175 In fact, the 
numbers have dropped in 2018.176 The minimum number of asylum 
seekers that each member states accepts responsibility for should be 
adjusted semi-annually or annually to reflect any changes in the previously 
                                                        
170  See also supra text accompanying notes 101-109.  
171  See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. 
172  Germany, Sweden and France are amongst the member states regarded to have excellent 
asylum systems. Diana Hodali & Astrid Prange, Asylum Benefits in the EU: How Member States 
Compare, DEUTSCHE WELLE (June 19, 2018), https://www.dw.com/en/asylum-benefits-in-the-eu-
how-member-states-compare/a-44298599. See also supra note 157. 
173  See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. 
174  The exception to this is Germany, which opened its borders to over a million migrants 
regardless of whether Germany was the state of first entry. Adam Taylor, Germany’s Small, Yet 
Important Change to the Way it Treats Syrian Refugees, WASH. POST (Aug. 26, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/08/26/germanys-small-yet-important-
change-to-the-way-it-deals-with-syrian-refugees/.  
175 Migration to Europe in Charts, BBC NEWS (Sept. 11, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44660699. More than 800,000 migrants entered Greece in 
2015. That number has been reduced to less than 21,000 in 2018. Italy’s numbers have also decreased 
to similar levels, receiving about 20,000 migrants in 2018. Id. 













mentioned factors. A maximum is not encouraged, because it can lead to 
many people being shut out of the asylum process.177 Also, it is impossible 
to know how many migrants will enter the EU seeking asylum.178 
Estimates could be incorrect, especially because of the migrants’ lack of 
documentation and illegal border-crossing by migrants.179 
Equitably distributing responsibility for asylum applications solves the 
issue of border states being overwhelmed, which leads to asylum officials 
in those member states not registering and fingerprinting migrants or 
getting backed up with applications, slowing down the process.180 
Equitable distribution also disincentives member states from building 
fences or closing off their borders.181 Even if there are a large number of 
migrants entering a member state due to its location at Europe’s external 
border, the majority of migrants will not stay in that country. Their claims 
and applications would be sent to the country responsible for them and 
will result in either transfer to the member state where the asylum seeker’s 
application is pending, has been accepted, or has been denied. In the case 
where an asylum seeker’s application has already been denied, the 
responsible member state would have responsibility of sending the 
applicant back to their home country.182 
Equitable distribution of responsibility would also solve the problem of 
overcrowding in hotspot migrant centers, thus reducing the possibility of 
human rights violations. Much of the concern over the condition of 
migrant centers, such as inadequate space, food, and healthcare, is tied to 
the extraordinary amount of migrants being sent to them.183 With fewer 
migrants to support, these migrant centers would likely have sufficient 
room and accommodations so that migrants are given adequate care.  
                                                        
177  Melissa Eddy, Germany’s Angela Merkel Agrees to Limits on Accepting Refugees, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/09/world/europe/germany-merkel-
refugees.html. In 2017, Germany agreed to limit the number of migrants allowed to enter the country 
and apply for asylum to 200,000. Id. This decision came after Germany suspended the Dublin 
Regulation in 2015, allowing over a million migrants into Germany despite what their state of first 
entry was. Id.  This angered many Germans and is partly responsible for the rise in popularity of far-
right political parties. Id.  
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visited Nov. 5, 2019). 
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180  Moses, supra note 51, at 12-13. 
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Another alternative to the “first entry” rule is to allow migrants to list 
their preferences upon registration. This will likely reduce the number of 
multiple applications submitted by migrants and illegal entrances into 
other member states. As previously discussed, migrants have preferences 
based on a number of factors, including language and job prospects.184 
These wishes should be respected. Some European organizations have 
suggested possible approaches to respecting migrants’ preferences. For 
example, Pro Asyl, a German pro-immigration organization, proposed that 
the free choice of the applicants be used for distribution by replacing the 
country of first arrival with that of the applicant’s first choice.185 Migrants 
who enter the EU through another country other than their first choice, 
would be given a permit and funding to travel within Europe to their 
intended destination.186 As attractive as this proposal seems, it can lead to 
another type of inequitable distribution between countries, one where 
countries with better reception and wealth will be doing the most lifting.187 
Pro Asyl recommends that compensation be offered to these countries.188 
If the costs of this approach are much less than those of the current Dublin 
Regulation rules, it may be worth looking into. Other approaches to taking 
into account the preferences of migrants include instituting a quota that 
                                                        
184  Mascareñas, supra note 131. 
185  Memorandum, Pro Asyl, For a Free Choice of Host Country in the EU Respecting Refugees’ 
Interests (Aug. 2015), https://www.proasyl.de/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/PRO_ASYL_Memorandum_free_choice_english_June_2015.pdf. Pro Asyl 
addressed the issue of too many migrants concentrating in just a few member states. Id. Many migrants 
seek to end up in member states like Germany and the United Kingdom because they have elite asylum 
systems. Id. These member states developed a tradition of migration after the large influx of labor 
migrants entered their borders in the 1950s in search of work. Christof Van Mol & Helga de Valk, 
Migration and Immigrants in Europe: A Historical and Demographic Perspective, in INTEGRATION 
PROCESSES AND POLICIES IN EUROPE 31 (Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas, Penninx R. eds., 2016). This 
familiarity with large scale migration has allowed these member states to engineer asylum systems that 
could handle the numbers arriving in the 2015 migration crisis. Pro-Asyl at 14-15. Thus, other member 
states must be allowed more time to develop the necessary structures that are similar to those in the 
highly sought out member states and can handle the high volume of migration, otherwise the standards 
of reception laid down by European law will continue to be unattainable and migrants will continue to 
seek out member states with the best reception. Id.  
186  Memorandum, Pro Asyl, Allocation of Refugees in the European Union: For an Equitable, 
Solidarity - Based System of Sharing Responsibility (2013), https://www.proasyl.de/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/Memorandum_Dublin_engl.pdf.  
187  Id. 
188  Id. at 7. Pro Asyl suggested that a compensation fund be set up for receiving member states 













balances the preferences of both the refugees and each member state and 
allowing the free movement of migrants within the EU.189 
Border states will more than likely always receive a disproportionate 
number of migrants entering to that of interior states, because they are 
more convenient for migrants to get to.190 Whether migrants stay in a 
border state or move on to another country, resources are needed in the 
border states, like Italy, for when these migrants arrive.191 Increased, 
targeted funding should be sent to the border states to help maintain 
migrant centers and help with registering or transferring migrants. This 
suggestion, however, is likely to be negatively received since the Dublin 
Regulation is already costly to administer.192 While it solves the problem 
of inadequate resources for migrants, it would increase costs. In addition 
to funding, more manpower is needed to process applications that are 
already in the system. The lack of staffing has led to lengthy asylum 
application processes.193 As with providing more financial aid to member 
states, this suggestion will increase the Dublin Regulation’s staggering 
costs. 
Increasing resources will likely decrease the number of migrants 
leaving poor conditions in border states and illegally entering interior 
member states in search of better conditions. The same is true if the 
asylum centers are better staffed. Migrants will not feel as much of a need 
to leave or file multiple asylum applications if applications are being 
processed much faster. Border states will be less likely to allow migrants 
to fall through the cracks because of no funding and lack of staffing. There 
would be less tension among the member states and protesting among the 
                                                        
189  Rapopart et al., Tradable Refugee-admission Quotas: a Policy Proposal to Reform the EU 
Asylum Policy (European Univ. Inst., Working Paper RSCAS 101, 2014), 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/33097/RSCAS_2014_101.pdf (Proposing a Tradable 
Refugee Quota System that takes into account both migrants’ preferences for particular member states 
and member states’ preferences for certain types of migrants). This system would allow European 
Governments to decide how many migrants they each want to receive commensurate with the costs of 
receiving them. Id. After coming up with a quota, the governments have the option of trading quotas 
with each other. They can opt to receive migrants in excess of their quota at a given price and vice 
versa; Guild et al., Enhancing the Common European Asylum System and Alternatives to Dublin 
(2015), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/519234/IPOL_STU(2015)519234_EN.pd
f (advocating for the free movement of refugees after being granted asylum).  
190  See supra text accompanying notes 71-73. 
191 Dan Ruetenik, Italy Overwhelmed, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/21/world/europe/italy-overwhelmed-migrant-crisis.html.  
192  See supra text accompanying notes 163-169. 
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citizens of the member states that is often influenced by the lack of 
assistance with the crisis from the EU and other member states. 
The EU has already increased staffing during the height of the crisis, 
but this did little to ease the burden.194 Increased funding and staffing 
should be requisite to the severity of the crisis.195 Now that there has been 
a decrease in migrants, these resources are not as necessary as they were 
back in 2015 and 2016.196 However, the EU should be better equipped 
with these resources for the next potential wave of migrants. 
Another alternative would be to completely repeal the Dublin 
Regulation. All member states should convene and decide on a universal 
system that is premised on burden sharing and actually protecting migrants 
fleeing war and persecution. The Dublin Regulation’s original goals 
should remain intact, but a more efficient means of achieving those goals 
is necessary.197 Including some of the suggestions discussed previously in 
a new system is advisable. 
CONCLUSION 
In order to preserve unity within the EU and provide sufficient support 
to migrants in legitimate need of humanitarian protection, the EU must 
consider reforming its current migration system. The Dublin Regulation 
has failed to adequately provide migrants with a fair chance at asylum 
because it overburdens the member states with the most incoming 
migrants, thus opening the floodgates to delayed asylum application 
processes and arbitrary denials of asylum.198 Migrants await decisions on 
their applications in dilapidated, overcrowded detention centers that they 
often describe as “prisons.”199 However, the blame cannot be placed on 
“hotspot” member states. They lack proper resources to begin with, and 
                                                        
194 Migrant Crisis: One Million enter Europe in 2015, BBC NEWS (Dec. 22, 2015), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35158769 (EU beefs up Frontex border patrol staff in 
Greece); Sergio Carrera et al., The EU’s Response to the Refugee Crisis: 
Taking Stock and Setting Policy Priorities 7 (2015) (EU member states supply nearly three 
hundred officials to assist in hotspot countries and Frontex supplies sixty new border control staff at 
the cost of €1.3 million). 
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enough to combat the growing migrant crisis in those member states.  
196  See BBC NEWS supra note 156. 
197  See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text. 
198  Park, supra note 65 













aid from the EU has barely addressed their needs.200 They have reacted by 
taking matters into their own hands and blocking entry into their 
countries.201 The migrant crisis has tested the Dublin Regulation’s limits 
and has exposed its biggest weaknesses. Now that the crisis has subsided, 
the EU must do something about its migrant policy so that they are 
prepared for future crises. Several proposals have been put forward, 
including imposing minimums and completely invalidating the Dublin 
Regulation and starting from scratch.202 It is unclear what path the EU will 
take, but change is imminent.203  
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